Challenges for the age of Robotics & AI

23 March 2017, 10am - 1pm, at CeBIT Hannover, Hall 8

Created at 15.02.2017

 

We live in exciting times where robots and Artificial Intelligence are quickly finding their way into our societies. These emerging technologies promise to have huge transformative effects to many sectors. However, their potential is accompanied by risks for human safety, dignity, privacy and autonomy. So far, only a few governments and parliaments are starting to gather information and endeavour to develop regulatory frameworks. The European Parliament's own-initiative report on Civil law rules on robotics demonstrates how this issue entered the political arena. Our conference at CeBIT is a venue for dialog between policy makers, practitioners, academics and ethics experts.

 

We are delighted to welcome the leading researcher in the field of AI Toby Walsh for the keynote address. Chief News Anchor at DW News Brent Goff will guide us through three panels where leading speakers will discuss the opportunities and challenges for Europe in the context of robotics and AI. In an open discussion our speakers will share their special insights, including demos of robotics applications. Short and powerful talks will leave time for questions and answers of the audience.

 

We raffle 150 FREE TICKETS to CeBIT! To win send an email to jan.albrecht [at]europarl.europa.eu with the subject "CeBIT Ticket".

 

10:00-10:15 Welcome by Jan Philipp Albrecht, Member of the European Parliament

10:15-10:45 Keynote by Toby Walsh, Professor, University of New South Wales

 

10:45-11:25    Panel I: Trends in AI & Robotics

Remi El-Ouazzane, CEO, Movidius an Intel Company

Toby Walsh, Professor, University of New South Wales

Lieve Van Woensel, Scientific Foresight Unit (STOA), European Parliament

 

11:25-11:35    Presentation

Nicolas Boudot, Sales Director EMEA, SoftBank Robotics (formerly Aldebaran)

 

11:35-12:15    Panel II: Ethical aspects of AI & Robotics

Dr. Michal Kosinski, Assistant Professor of Organizational Behaviour Graduate School of Business, Stanford University

Frederike Kaltheuner, Policy Officer at Privacy International

Dr. Jochen Leidner, Director Research, Thomson Reuters

 

12:15-12:55    Panel III: Policy for AI & Robotics

Mady Delvaux, Member of the European Parliament

Dr Sandra Wachter, Researcher in Data Ethics, Alan Turing Institute

 

Closing remarks by Jan Philipp Albrecht, Member of the European Parliament

 

The conference will be live streamed.

 

 

Reshaping European Policing: From Adhocracy to Sustainable Security

Created at 02.02.2017

Noch vier Wochen bis zum 5. Grünen Polizeikongress! Am 4. März diskutieren wir in Berlin über EU-weite grenz-überschreitende Polizeiarbeit, Erfolgsmodelle für De-radikalisierung und Prävention und eine bürgerfreundliche Polizei. Gäste sind Vertreterinnen und Vertreter aus Praxis, Zivilgesellschaft, Wissenschaft und Politik. Einen Vor-geschmack gibt die Broschüre „Wege zu einer alternativen Sicherheitspolitik“, in der dieser Beitrag erschienen ist. Wissenschaftlerinnen und Praktiker geben Einblicke in ihre Ideen zu europäischer Zusammenarbeit von Polizei und Justiz, einer bürgernahen Polizei, der angemessenen Ausbildung von Polizistinnen und Polizisten und den Möglichkeiten parlamentarischer Kontrolle.

 

Reshaping European Policing: From Adhocracy to Sustainable Security

Prof. Dr. Monica den Boer, Police Academy of The Netherlands

 

01. INTRODUCTION

European Police Cooperation has primarily been designed around the political desire to control transnational security issues, such as terrorism and organised crime. However, despite the recent turn to “intelligence-led policing” and “proactive policing”, far less attention has been given to the potential role of European law enforcement agencies in tackling the causes of insecurity, and for positioning European policing in a citizens-oriented context. Moreover, beyond the discourse about the lessons that can be learnt from EU police missions, there is little or no talk about sustainable policing in the sense of more durable, cost-effective and “ecological” policing. This essay probes the question to what extent the concept of sustainability could provide a lens on the future development of European public policing and on the cooperation between domestic law enforcement agencies. Inter alia, we will deal with the question what lessons can be learnt from domestic policing environments in which “sustainable policing” has become an officially endorsed strategy for the strategic development of policing.

The essay first takes stock of the main trends that have dominated the scene of European policing for the past two decades: within the context of the European Union, there has been ample initiative to build an extensive regulatory framework for “vertical police cooperation” by the creation of several agencies (Europol, Frontex, CEPOL and SitCen) as well as “horizontal police cooperation” by shaping a legal context which allows police officers in the Member States to  engage in direct cross-border interaction. The main trend that we have identified is that despite all its strategising and programming, many of the instruments on the European police co-operation can be qualified as ad hoc as they do no fit a pre-designed conception of where we would like to stand with European policing on the longer term. Moreover, the dynamic of this “policing without a blueprint” can be further qualified as an incremental patchwork of legal extensions, opt-out clauses and derivations, which has turned the field of European police cooperation into a very complex one which can neither be fully controlled by democratic oversight institutions nor by the European citizens.

This treatise of European policing as it has been established thus far is then succeeded by analysing what “sustainability” might mean. In fact, there is not much of a guidance, not even the Concise Oxford Dictionary, which defines “to sustain” as “to maintain”, “to keep”, or “going continuously”. In the context of policing, one might well equate the concept of sustainability with guaranteeing strategic consistency and implementation (across forces and between leadership generations), getting away from conceptual hype and incident-triggered policing, as well as making sure that policing is consistently based on the cornerstones of public service.

Hence, this essay uses those cornerstones as ten points on the horizon for the reshaping of European policing. Additional guidance is provided by the re-conceptualisation of the security agenda, which has been addressed in the context of the United Nations Post-2015 agenda.2 The sustainable security approach encompasses the human security concept (Den Boer and De Wilde, 2008; Kaldor, Martin and Selchow, 2007) which in turn focuses on the well-being and safety of individuals rather than on the protection of states (Smith, 2008). It follows that when the sustainable security concept is projected onto policing, one of the leading perspectives is that of a public police service which serves the community. The role of public police forces throughout Europe include crisis-management and conflict prevention, both on a local as well as on a global scale.

 

02. INCREMENTAL INSTITUTIONALISM

With a European-wide acknowledgement of transnational threats, such as drugs, terrorism and organised crime, the Member States of the EU initiated several different modes of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. Two decades ago, this cooperation was formalised in the context of the Treaty of Maastricht. Ever since, the evolution of police co-operation as a common field of action has been characterised by its incremental and piecemeal growth. National sovereignty concerns have prevented Member States  from courageously agreeing on a long-term blueprint for European policing. The reason is that public policing is primarily a responsibility of the nation states, as public police forces act on behalf of the state and carry the monopoly of violence. Secondly, policing is very much subject to the whimsicality of daily politics inside the Member States. Though police forces have been enabled to grow significantly in most Member States, the economic crisis has necessitated budgetary cuts and “austerity measures”, which in some Member States culminates to cut-downs of as much as 20%, both in the military and police forces. The economic crisis may on the one hand be a blessing in disguise for European police cooperation, as it prompts European police forces to look more critically at their own expenditure and to be creative in European solutions (pooling, sharing, integrating). On the other hand however, the need to enhance efficiency and to reduce expenditure may also lead to a narrowing of the scope of European police forces, to the extent that they turn more inwardly.

Despite the reluctance of national police forces to cooperate wholeheartedly in the European space, the main trend at EU level has been to establish several agencies that have a law enforcement mandate. This institutionalisation process dates from the early nineties and was reinforced with the adoption of the Tampere Programme in 1999, which provided the strategic policy impulse for the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. Meanwhile, there has been a steady increase in mandate, budget, and scope of the relevant agencies, varying from the Office for the Fight against Fraud (OLAF), to the European Police Office (Europol), Frontex (the European Border Management Agency), Eurojust and the European Police Academy CEPOL. For the purpose of this essay, it reaches too far to present a precise reconstruction of the way the mandate of these agencies has gradually been expanded. The process of incremental institutionalism has often been prompted by ad hoc crises and large-scale incidents, such as the terrorist attacks on 9/11. It follows that much of what is currently part of the institutional landscape has been created without a full-blown public debate amongst the European citizens about the necessity and proportionality of these agencies. Neither has there been much public or parliamentary scrutiny of the instruments that have been adopted to facilitate European police co-operation (think of the Framework Decisions on the European Arrest Warrant or the Joint Investigation Teams). The majority of European citizens live in the absence of knowledge about large international information data bases which can be used for law enforcement purposes.

The institutional policing landscape that has been established in the EU thus far, is very much one that has cultivated a top-down structure of co-operation and information-sharing. For instance, Europol primarily interacts with national police agencies through Europol National Units. One of the problems that has been acknowledged in the policing arena is the general reluctance to share information and intelligence with European partners. Police cooperation in Europe can only work if professionals acknowledge the existence of formal European police information channels, and if they regard them as trusted means of communicating with foreign partners. A feasible – and sustainable – European space of policing can thus only work if the tools that have been provided to police professionals are actively used within an operational context. An insight that has been provided by Block (2011) is that the implementation of European police cooperation instruments has been poor, due to the fact that several instruments have been developed without taking into account the professional rationality. Moreover, national police agencies seem to lack a plan for deep and sustainable implementation of EU instruments on police co-operation. Some national police chiefs even complain about EU-overkill and even regard the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights as additional – and hence unwanted – bureaucracy.3 The binding effect of European judicial decisions will become more prominent when the European Court of Justice assumes jurisdiction in areas such as (non-operational) police cooperation as per 1 December 2014.

What we need for an EU area of sustainable policing is a commonly agreed cyclical governance framework which comprises a variety of components, ranging from policy-making, legislation and implementation, to oversight and evaluation. It is essential that lessons can be learned from practice and that recommendations for improvement are shared in an open and transparent manner. Currently, there is little systematic coherence between the activities of oversight mechanisms, ranging from the European Parliament, the EU Fundamental Rights Agency, the European Court of Auditors and the European Data Protection Supervisor. Hence, a preliminary condition for an effective and sustainable area of European police cooperation is good governance. This can begin with the design of a system of oversight and accountability (see also Den Boer, 2002; Den Boer, Hillebrand and Noelke, 2008; 2013).

 

03. AD HOC CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION A more positive tone amongst police practitioners is usually struck about instruments that “really facilitate” cross-border police co-operation through direct contact, information-exchange between individual police officers, and the use of operational police powers across national borders (such as “hot pursuit” or “controlled delivery”). This category of police cooperation instruments includes the Schengen Implementing Agreement, which dates from 1990 and which was integrated into the EU acquis by virtue of the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997. Building on previously agreed bilateral and multilateral agreements – like the Benelux Treaty – the Schengen agreement includes a range of legal provisions on external border control, immigration, judicial co-operation and police co-operation.4 The rationale behind the agreement was that if internal borders were to be abolished between the Member States of the (then) European Community, it would create a security gap as law enforcement organisations could no longer exercise border controls as a method to fight crime and to identify illegal immigration.

In the meantime, the number of participating states in the Schengen Agreement has risen considerably. All EU Member States are involved, except the United Kingdom and Ireland that have opted out (to maintain the Common Travel Area), Cyprus (because of the external border that runs across the island), and Bulgaria and Romania (which have been denied access by some other Member States because organised crime and corruption have not been controlled to a sufficient extent). Iceland, Norway, Switzerland and Liechtenstein have acceded Schengen as associate states. Another significant evolution of Schengen is its successor agreement – the Prüm Treaty – which extends cross-border police cooperation. The mutual co-operation and information exchange now also applies to fingerprints and vehicle registration data. Personal and non-personal data may be exchanged formally or informally in order to prevent serious crime or public order offences, through “black lists” of individuals. Joint police performance is now also possible by virtue of the Prüm Treaty: in the event of an emergency police officers may act without prior authorisation on the territory of another signatory. Finally, in the field of cross-border policing, joint law enforcement interventions have been made possible (such as “Joint Hit Teams”).

Initially, the negotiations on Schengen and its further development took place beyond the scope of parliamentary control. In fact, executive law has been incorporated into the main body of EU-law without proper parliamentary scrutiny. It was rather astonishing that this process of executive law-making was more or less repeated with the negotiations on the Prüm Treaty. Meanwhile, a significant part of the Prüm Treaty has been lifted into the EU-acquis.

The reality is that police co-operation arrangements under Schengen and Prüm are complemented by regional and bilateral agreements, such as the Senningen Treaty (Benelux) and the Treaty of Enschede which has been concluded between The Netherlands and Germany. Altogether, this makes the governance and operational use of European provisions on police co-operation vastly complex. The question is very much whether this is sustainable. The European Parliament should make request from the Commission that all EU-provisions on police co-operation are integrated into a core legislative body on European police legislation. Before doing so, however, it is also crucial that the legislation that has been adopted thus far, is made subject to a critical assessment. With its new post-Lisbon powers, the European Parliament can initiate hearings and investigations, which may form the basis for ensuring more legislative consistency between the police co-operation instruments.5

 

04. TOWARDS SUSTAINABLE POLICING: 10 POINTS ON THE HORIZON

An issue that lingers on the background is the question to what extent we are collectively blinded by the mere focus on regulating police co-operation in the context of the European Union. Far less reflection has been expressed about the values on which European policing should be based. Do we practice what we preach, for instance? The EU increasingly presents itself not just as an emerging security actor in its own right (Curtin, 2011), but also as an actor that seeks to export Rule of Law norms to other jurisdictions, for instance in the enlargement process and in the co-operation with neighbouring countries. A European policing complex which enjoys public legitimacy should focus on the needs of communities and citizens. As a visible organisation in society, police forces are co-responsible for managing cultural and societal cohesion. The Council of Europe defines social cohesion as an essential condition for future security (Council of Europe, 2010). EU law enforcement organisations which have thus far been driven by high politics, will have to invest more effort into a needs-driven approach. With the recent turn of Europol to issues like cybercrime, child pornography, financial crimes and the trafficking in human beings, it will be possible to create a conceptual link between crimes, their causes and effects on the lives of human beings. Europol, Frontex, and Eurojust will experience increased oversight from the side of the EU, but popular support for these organisations can merely be gained if it can be demonstrated that there are real results in terms of crime reduction. The internal and external governance of the EU agencies may be subjected to rationalisation by meeting a variety of parameters, such as responsive performance, normative alignment, cost-effectiveness, the reduction of bureaucracy, procedural standardisation, the reduction of fragmentation, the management of expectations, standardisation of recruitment and professionalisation, common infrastructures (ICT), robust transition management,  financial sustainability and consistent leadership.

If European policing is to become sustainable, a values-based approach is crucial. The following framework incorporates dimensions of police reform programmes which are often implemented in the ream of domestic police organisations. These dimensions can also be reframed as cornerstones for a model of sustainable European policing.

First, citizens’ rights based policing involves that policing is based on the Rule of Law, which encompasses consistent adherence to universal human rights, fair trial rules, access to justice, and data protection. Within Europe, the fundamental rights charter and the European Convention on Human Rights are essential for European policing. Moreover, police organisations cannot function properly if they do not enjoy the trust and support of the citizens in the community. Undesirable situations may emerge such as under-policing, no-go areas, or private vigilantism.

Second, participative policing is often seen as a preliminary condition for public legitimacy as it advocates the nurturing of sustainable engagement with the community. This means that communication with and consultation of the community is one of the key ingredients of sustainable policing. We have recently seen several examples where citizens are given a more active role in taking care of their own safety and security. From the perspective of the human security strategy, it is expected that communities (are assisted to) be resilient and supportive and to carry their own responsibility in safety issues. Another example of participative policing is “responsibilisation”, which comes down to activating citizens in signalling and alerting crime and insecurity, as well as activating them in early warning, response and resilience, particularly with a view to emergency response. The role of social media is paramount in the participatory model. The model of “reassurance policing” is also relevant here, as it drives on the (theoretical) assumption that citizens can act as early identifiers of criminogenic situations. In many societies, citizens can also play an active role in conflict resolution and dispute mediation.

Third, democratic policing is based on the idea that police organisations act in a legitimate capacity within democratic societies, and that their work is accountable. Above, it was argued that the democratic nature of European policing shows gaps and that this must be improved by paying more consistent attention to the way in which police organisations define and execute their mandate, to the selection of senior police leadership, and to the strategic reform of agencies. In order to enhance popular understanding of the European policing complex, citizens ought to be given sufficient information about intentions and results (Crawford, 2012). Democratic policing is often advocated as a model which helps to restore legitimacy of public administration. Moreover, one of the key principles of democratic policing is responsiveness (Neyroud, 2005: 592)

This brings us to the fourth cornerstone of sustainable European policing, namely that it should be outcome-oriented. This means that there should be wider debate about what kind of areas citizens think police organisations should address: in what areas do we really want European Policing to be active and performative? Are we happy with how safety and security issues are framed? How can public concerns be monitored? Does a Eurobarometer help us to understand and respond to citizens’ needs? As Tony Blair once said, there can be a great gap between crime and safety statistics and the way people feel safe and confident. How can professionals and the public contribute to evidence-based policing, in which the effect of policing strategies is first tested before they become standard practice? What is the effect of certain police interventions on crime and what can the public learn about strategic shifts in policing?

Fifthly, an indispensible cornerstone of sustainable policing is the pursuance of legitimate policing, in which accountability and oversight are pivotal elements. The OSCE defines argues that legitimacy of policing can be strengthened by being visible and accessible to the public; by knowing and be known by the public; by responding to the needs of the community; by listening to the concerns of the community; by engaging and mobilising the communities; and by being accountable for their activities and the outcome of these activities (OSCE, 2008). Closely related is the sixth cornerstone, namely ethical policing, which first and foremost necessitates the alignment with and the enforcement of international police codes of ethics.6 This means that all police professionals should be ethically trained and that police are responsible for the protection of ethics values. As the current Director of Europol Rob Wainwright said in an interview for the purpose of our Handbook on Good Policing (Den Boer and Pyo, 2011):

“When I think about ethics I think of moral values. It has a broad application, covering everything. It reflects the standard of human behaviour in the workplace. This means that it covers leadership, values of the organisation and communication with partners. But it is also about constructing a legal framework on how you collect and use information about citizens. In this respect fundamental rights and democratic accountability are very important for Europol.”

In its strategies on organised crime as well as its multi-annual strategies, the EU has clearly propagated a multi-disciplinary approach to organised crime and terrorism. In fact, multi-agency policing has been on the table for quite a while and could also be regarded as another cornerstone of sustainable European policing. “Plural policing” is not merely a theory, but increasingly also a practice in many EU Member States. Policing is not merely performed by public police forces and this means that public police organisations are encouraged to build sustainable partnerships. Both the European Union and the Council of Europe7 advocate partnerships between the criminal justice system and civil society. This requires a strategy of policing which is based on solidarity and sharing rather than power, competition and ownership: the European Union (Council of Europe, 2000) noted that despite the fact that there are now more bilateral and regional practices of multi-agency cooperation (for instance the Police Customs Cooperation Centres), inter-agency co-operation is still an area of concern, including the co-operation between law enforcement and fiscal authorities and it was concerned about the cocooning culture of those organisations:

“Many crimes can be prevented or speedily resolved if intelligence available to one agency can be shared with other agencies, nationally and internationally. However, this intelligence may not be recognised as being useful to other agencies, there may not be secure channels through which the intelligence can be passed on, or these other agencies may be distrusted.”

The European Council recommended that the interlinkage between organisations could be bolstered by the “principle of mutual recognition”, which in fact has become the core principle of criminal justice co-operation within the EU and which has effectively replaced the legal harmonisation strategy. In order to make sure that this multi-agency co-operation works well, closer research is needed on the conditions for successful multi-agency cooperation. Is it trust which has been cultivated through professional networking and reciprocal business? Is it a matter of financing? In any case, it is instructive to provide incentives for sustainable multi-agency cooperation (which means more than just one project or one Joint Investigation Team).

Another cornerstone of sustainable European policing is a focus on preventive policing. The EU has adopted several instruments that propagate a preventive approach to crime and security issues (European Council, 2000). Some instruments focus on the improvement of proactive information-gathering, but there are also instruments that seek to enhance the immunity of the public and legitimate private sector against the penetration of organised crime. More recently, the EU has sought to incorporate the administrative control of crime in its policies. Preventive policing may include the identification of root causes of persistent security deficits against the backdrop of complex environments and multiple drivers and developing an internationally cooperative approach (Abbott, Rodgers and Sloboda, 2006: 29). Criminality may be caused by deeper underlying issues such as the growing scarcity of resources and the growing gap between the rich and the poor. By seeking to reduce the vulnerability to youth delinquency, radicalisation and re-offending, the EU endorses an early interruption in criminal careers with a view to preventing recidivism as well as social integration (Council of Europe, 2000). Moreover, the EU as well as the Council of Europe advocate best-practice projects on the prevention and reduction of domestic violence. In addition, it contributes to ensuring the transfer of knowledge to trainers, health-care workers, police officers and other professionals.8

The EU does not merely have an internal responsibility, but also an external one, for instance by delivering technical assistance to applicant countries which supports the development of democratic and efficient law enforcement systems and appropriate public administration, and the adjustment of institutions and law in order to align them with EU legislation. This cornerstone, which is reform-oriented policing, expresses itself through missions, security sector reform (SSR), and police reform in developing countries. In line with the ambition of sustainability, international police assistance projects should be meaningful and sustainable: there should be a central position for evaluation and learning loops which help to keep a track record of experiences, support knowledge transfer as well as help the organisation (police and/or military) to improve future missions (Osland, 2004: 546; Merlingen and Ostrauskaitè, 2006; Collantes Celador, 2008: 234).9 But we need to keep asking ourselves whether reforms are genuinely sustainable, in the sense that they generate long-term ownership and commitment of the local population. Too often, police reform is bound to fail given the foreign-driven demands for transition and the lack of embedded (local) ownership.

A final cornerstone of sustainable European policing is “green policing”. Police organisations carry a crucial responsibility in sustainable development. First, they are the competent authority in enforcing compliance with international environmental standards (Ruessink and Zaelke, 2013). European police leadership should take an effort to bring the “green policing” concept beyond the control of environmental crime. “Green policing” should not merely imply that police forces show an effort in investigating environmental crimes. When one googles “green policing”, what usually pops up is information about the colour of the police vehicles or the uniforms. On a more serious note, there are examples of police forces that practice sustainable, “green” or ecological policing. Caring for the planet is also a responsibility for public and private actors. In The Netherlands, the Quality Office of the Dutch police service developed a project on sustainable procurement and entrepreneurialism with a focus on People, Planet and Profit (or Prosperity). Police services were encouraged to become leading as the Police Force of the Future.10 A sustainable police management perspective has been adopted in some local Belgian police forces.11 Police organisations operate in a sustainable manner: e.g. low carbon use, “green” technology. Other examples are the use of environmentally-friendly criteria in procurement of police vehicles; encouraging police officers to use public transport when they commute; sustainable repair of police vehicles; the use of electric (police) scooters. Also company clothing, ICT facilities, cleaning, printing, catering and accommodation are elements that could be subject of “green” policing (Ruessink and Zaelke, 2013): “In police organisations, care for the environment can best be safeguarded with an environmental management system”, which makes it possible to pay structural attention to all environmental aspects and consequences of the operational management of an (police) organisation.

Some projects are known, for instance in Scotland: budgetary pressure forces public services to fundamentally re-think of how a range of services can be delivered. In fact, the economic crisis forces a re-contemplation towards a model of policing which is sustainable in the long term: high standard and cost-effective.12  Several police organisations, such as the London Metropolitan Police and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, have advanced experience with the implementation of sustainable development. Huessink and Zaelke (2013: 9) raise a plea for an International Police Platform for Sustainable Development, which may facilitate and stimulate a process of exchange, learning and improvement.

Hence, “green policing” could be embraced as a cornerstone for European sustainable policing as it endorses a strategy of managing and safeguarding scarce resources, exploiting sustainable means & technology, and innovating with an eye to the future. From the above, it emerges that a sustainable policing strategy consists of several dimensions, and that a comprehensive approach is required in order to make sure that public police organisations throughout the EU feel committed to such a strategy.

 

05. CONCLUDING NOTES: TOWARDS SUSTAINABLE EUROPEAN POLICING

Above, we have discussed the way in which the EU has established an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, and more in particular to European police co-operation. This essay has sought to argue that much of the institutional and regulatory landscape of European policing is littered with well-meant but ad hoc instruments that are supposed to trigger effective cross-border police co-operation. Although an increasing number of European police professionals are becoming closely acquainted with instruments for European police co-operation, many tools remain unused due to sluggish implementation in the Member States and insufficient support from senior police leadership.

Hence, this essay is a plea for a more sustainable (durable) governance of European policing, which is not just built on legal instruments, but principally on values. By consistently embracing fundamental rights and ethics, a sustainable European police culture may arise which does not merely focus the symptoms, but seeks to tackle the root causes of crime and insecurity. Given the representative status of public police forces in societies, they can lead the way and show the example towards sustainable solutions, sustainable management directions (e.g. diversity in police organisations) and sustainable police leadership. Hence, European policing could be placed in a wider future perspectives model which looks at the impact of the lack of sustainability, for instance oriented on critical constraints and uncertainties (Chatham House, 2012). Police forces throughout Europe will have to prepare themselves for the consequences of deeper societal, economic and environmental transformations: food and energy prices will go up, demographic changes will have an impact on security perceptions, increased urbanisation necessitates a re-think about community policing, and climate change can both threaten human security as well as traditional national security. These may be large-scale doom-like scenarios which on the surface may leave the police profession untouched. But why wait for a crisis if we already know the answer?

 

FOOTNOTES

1  The views expressed in this essay do not represent the official view of the Police Academy of The Netherlands.

2 For instance, the Center for American Progress defines sustainable security as follows: “Sustainable security redefines how we think about national security in today’s shifting, globalised world. Instead of focusing solely on traditional threats, we also need to help spur greater prosperity, encourage effective international development, and work to protect innocent civilians. Such an approach is good for us and good for others. While we need to maintain a highly capable military, diplomacy and development can often be more cost-effective investments that create new opportunities, prevent crises before military force is required, and better manage our shared challenges.” See: www.americanprogress.org/about/ss-about/; accessed 5 April 2013.

3 Some complaints were expressed about the additional administrative costs generated by the Salduz vs Turkey decision of the European Court of Human Rights on 27 November 2008 (application no. 36391/02).

4 These include: Mutual assistance and direct information exchange between police services (Article 39 SIC); Cross-Border Surveillance (Article 40 SIC); Cross-Border Pursuit (Article 41 SIC); Communication Links (Article 44 SIC); Information Exchange via Central Law Enforcement Authorities (Article 46 SIC); Liaison Officers (Article 47 SIC); Controlled Delivery (Article 73 SIC);  and other provisions such as on the Schengen Information System and the Schengen Manual on police cooperation in the field of public order and security.

5 See for instance: “Schengen governance after the Lisbon Treaty”, Library Briefing, Library of the European Parliament, 18/03/2013; www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/bibliotheque/briefing/2013/130358/LDM_BRI(2013)130358_REV1_EN.pdf; accessed 12 April 2013.

6 See for instance the Council of Europe Code on Police Ethics: polis.osce.org/library/f/2687/500/CoE-FRA-RPT-2687-EN-European%20Code%20of%20Police%20Ethics.pdf

7 See for instance Congress of Local and Regional Authorities (2003), Resolution 160 (2003) on local partnership for preventing and combating violence at school; wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp; accessed 5 April 2013.

8 See for instance Work Programme of the European Crime Prevention Network 2013, www.eucpn.org/work-prog/index.asp; accessed 5 April 2013.

9 See also “Future of ESDP: Lessons from Bosnia”, in European Security Review, Number 29, June 2006, p. 1; www.eulex-kosovo.eu/training/material/docs/esdp/ARTICLE_4_LESSONS_FROM_BOSNIA.pdf, where it is noted that the EU failed to learn from the UN experience, by not ascertaining that officers took an English language test upon arrival and for having failed to check whether they had the required skills and management experience.

10 www.duurzamedinsdag.nl/ARCHIEF/ARCHIEF+2008/NIEUWS/Duurzame+Dinsdag+Politie.

11 Lokale politie Sint-Pieters-Leeuw eerste politiezone met duurzaamheidsrapport; www.mvovlaanderen.be/kenniscentrum/praktijkvoorbeeld/lokale-politie-sint-pieters-leeuw-eerste-politiezone-met-duurzaamheidsrapport/t/mvo-communicatie-en-rapportering/s/openbare-besturen/; accessed 5 April 2013.

12 See Sustainable Policing Project, March 2011, www.smartpolicinginitiative.com/library-and-multimedia-resources/sustainment/sustainable-policing-project; accessed 5 April 2013. Parameters have been defined by the five objectives of the Scottish Government, namely that the police service should contribute to a wealthier and fairer, healthier, safer and stronger, smarter, and greener Scotland. See also Joop Koster, “Sustainable policing to serve communities and to fight crime”, OracleDaily, 7 January 2013; www.unitask.com/oracledaily/2013/01/07/sustainable-policing-to-serve-communities-and-fight-crime/, accessed 5 April 2013.

 

REFERENCES

Abbott, Chris, Rogers, Paul, and Sloboda, John (2006), Global Responses to Global Threats. Sustainable Security for the 21st Century. Oxford, Oxford Research Group, Briefing Paper, June 2006; oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/sites/default/files/globalthreats.pdf; accessed 5 April 2013.

Block, Ludo (2011), From Politics to Policing. The Hague, Boom/Eleven Publishers.

Chatham House (2012), Lee, Bernice, Preston, Felix, Kooroshy, Jaakko, Bailey, Rob, Lahn, Glada (authors), Resources Futures. A Chatham House Report. Royal Institute of International Affairs, London (www. chathamhouse.org).

Council of Europe (2010), New Strategy and Council of Europe Action Plan for Social Cohesion, approved by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 7 July 2010; www.coe.int/t/dg3/socialpolicies/socialcohesiondev/source/2010Strategy_ActionPlan_SocialCohesion.pdf; accessed 5 April 2013.

Collantes Celador, Gemma (2008), “Becoming ‘European’ through police reform: a successful strategy in Bosnia and Herzegovina?”, Crime, Law and Social Change, 51, 2, pp. 231-242.

Crawford, Adam (2012), “Police and crime commissioners are not just for Christmas. Some reflections on the electoral aftermath and the future of police ‘privatisation’. www.bss.leeds.ac.uk/2012/12/20/police-and-crime-commissioners-are-not-just-for-christmas/; accessed 5 April 2013.

Curtin, Deirdre (2011), Top Secret Europe. Amsterdam, University of Amsterdam.

Den Boer, Monica (2002), “Towards an Accountability Regime for an Emerging European Policing Governance“, Policing and Society, Special Issue: “Policing Accountability in Europe”, (Guest editor), Volume 12, Number 4, December 2002, pp. 275-289.

Den Boer, Monica (2013), “Human Rights and Police Cooperation in the European Union: Recent Developments in Accountability and Oversight”, Cahiers Politiestudies, 2013 – 2, no. 27, pp. 28-45.

Den Boer, Monica, Hillebrand, Claudia and Noelke, Andreas (2008),   “Legitimacy Under Pressure: The European Web of Counter-Terrorism Networks”, with Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 46, No. 1, pp. 101-124.

Den Boer, Monica, and De Wilde, Jaap (2008) (Eds.), The Viability of Human Security, Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press.

Den Boer, Monica and Pyo, Changwon (2011), Good Policing. Instruments, Models and Practices. Asia-Europe Foundation (ASEF), Brussels / Jakarta: www.asef.org/index.php.

European Council (2000), The prevention and control of organised crime: a European Union Strategy for the Beginning of the New Millennium, OJ C 124, 3.5.2000.

Kaldor, Mary, Martin, Mary, Selchow, Sabine (2007), “Human security: A new strategic narrative for Europe”, in International Affairs, 83, 2, pp. 273-288.

Merlingen, Michael and Ostrauskaitè, Rasa (2006), Peacebuilding and Policing: Governance and the European Security and Defence Policy, Oxon, Routledge.

Neyroud, Peter (2005), “Policing and Ethics”, in Newburn, Tim (2005) (Ed.), Handbook of Policing, Collumpton, Willan Publishing, 578-602.

OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe) (2008), Good Practices in Building Police-Public Partnerships, Senior Police Adviser to the OSCE Secretary General, OSCE, Vienna.

Osland, Kari M. (2004), “The Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, in International Peacekeeping, vol. 11, No. 3, Autumn 2004, pp. 544-560.

Ruessink, B.H. and Zaelke, D. (2013), Sustainable development – a new challenge for the police, INECE – International Network for Environmental Compliance and Enforcement, www.inece.org/europe/police.pdf; accessed 5 April 2013.

Smith, Gayle E. (2008), In Search of Sustainable Security. Linking National Security, Human Security, and Collective Security to Protect America and Our World., www.americanprogress.org; accessed 5 April 2013.

 

MONICA DEN BOER Dr., holds a position at the Police Academy of The Netherlands and is a Member of the Committee on European Integration of the Advisory Council on International Affairs. She obtained a PhD in 1990 from the European University Institute and worked at Edinburgh University, the Netherlands Study Centre for Crime and Law Enforcement, the European Institute of Public Administration, Tilburg University, and the European Institute of Law Enforcement Co-operation. Between March 2004 and January 2012 she was professor of Comparative Public Administration at the VU University Amsterdam on behalf of the Police Academy of The Netherlands. In 2009, she was a member of the Dutch Iraq Investigation Committee, and in 2009-2010 she participated in the Defence Future Survey Group. She has published widely on European internal security co-operation and engages in teaching, coaching as well as supervision.

Stand up for Snowden

Discussion in the European Parliament in Brussels

Created at 14.12.2016

23 January 2017 13:30 – 14:30, European Parliament in Brussels, room ASP 5E1

 

Jan Philipp Albrecht, vice-chair of the EP civil liberties committee and rapporteur for the EU’s general data protection regulation, invites to a discussion with the lawyers of Edward Snowden, Wolfgang Kaleck and Ben Wizner. How are Snowden’s chances for returning to the United States or getting protection in the EU?

 

Unfortunately it is not possible to register for the event anymore. There will be a live stream on Facebook and Periscope for everyone who would like to follow the discussion on the internet.

 

Since the former CIA analyst and NSA contractor Edward Snowden informed the public about the massive surveillance by American and European intelligence services in June 2013, quite a few things have happened. On 29th October 2015, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on the electronic mass surveillance of EU citizens as a follow-up to its inquiry in 2013. In this resolution, the EP called on EU Member States “to drop any criminal charges against Edward Snowden, grant him protection and consequently prevent extradition or rendition by third parties, in recognition of his status as whistle-blower and international human rights defender”. In Germany, after two years of legal struggles, the federal administrative court decided in November 2016 that hearing Edward Snowden before the parliament’s inquiry committee cannot longer be blocked. The sad truth however is that in the EU, neither surveillance measures by member states nor intelligence cooperation with the Unites Stated have been significantly reduced.

 

Wolfgang Kaleck Berlin-based lawyer Wolfgang Kaleck represents whistle-blower Edward Snowden in Germany. Kaleck is a lawyer specialised in European and international criminal law and human rights. In 2007 he co-founded the European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights, a non-profit human rights NGO based in Berlin, and has served as its secretary-general since then.

 

Ben Wizner Civil liberties defender Ben Wizner has been Edward Snowden’s lawyer in the Unites States since 2013. Wizner is director of the „Speech, Privacy, and Technology” project at the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). 

 

 

 

Data Protection across the Atlantic

Historical break-through with the “Umbrella Agreement”

Created at 01.12.2016

On 1st December 2016, the European Parliament will vote on the conclusion of the Agreement between the United States of America and the European Union on the protection of personal information relating to the prevention, investigation, detection, and prosecution of criminal offenses.

 

Watch Jan's speech on the agreement in the plenary session of 30 November 2016.

 

The agreement is also known as the “Umbrella Agreement”. Jan Philipp Albrecht has been the Parliament’s chief negotiator (“rapporteur”) on this agreement since it was kicked off in 2010, after repeated calls from the European Parliament.

 

Negotiations were slow for the first years, but gained new momentum after the revelations by Edward Snowden. The final text was agreed on 8 September 2015 by the negotiators from the US Department of Justice and the European Commission, and approved by the EU Member States in July 2016. After the European Parliament’s approval and just before the end of the Obama administration, we can witness a historical break-through: The first time in history the United States enter into a binging international agreement on data protection.

 

No new data transfers, but harmonised high data protection

The “Umbrella Agreement” is not a legal basis for transfers of personal data, therefore is does by no means authorise any new data transfers. The purpose of the Agreement is to ensure a high level of data protection in situations where personal data are transferred to across the Atlantic from the EU to law enforcement authorities in the US or vice versa. Any data transfers have to be based on a separate legal basis, either in EU-US agreements or in bilateral agreements between the Member States and the US, e.g. mutual legal assistance treaties or air passenger data agreements (PNR). The Umbrella Agreement supplements the protections and safeguards of these agreements, and enhances and harmonises the data subject rights. It contains provisions on purpose and use limitations of data transferred, data quality and integrity, rules on onward transfer, right to access and rectification, judicial redress and enforceability. It also covers data transferred by private entities of one party to law enforcement authorities of the other party where there is a legal basis for that; however, it does not cover data exchanges between national security authorities, nor between private entities. National security is outside of the EU competence, and private data transfers are regulated by the General Data Protection Regulation.

 

After the Parliament’s Legal Service in its opinion of 14 January 2015 however raised some issues that could need further clarification, Jan Philipp Albrecht as rapporteur managed to get a written declaration from the European Commission that confirms the legal interpretation of the EU side. It will be published in the Official Journal of the EU together with the Agreement and will therefore also guide interpretation by the Court of Justice if necessary.One of the clarifications concerns the last part-sentence of Article 5(3) (“no further authorisation [for data transfers] shall be required”). This clause does not provide for a de-facto adequacy decision, but merely states that no further legal basis than the respective agreement referred to in Article 3(1) shall be necessary, which is already the case. The Commission also clarified that the presumption of compliance of the US with applicable international transfer rules is not an automatic, but a qualified one, which is refutable and does not affect the powers of the data protection authorities.

 

Judicial Redress for EU Citizens in the US

In order to finalise the EU-US Umbrella Agreement, the US Congress had to adopt the Judicial Redress Act which amends the Privacy Act of 1974 and grants judicial redress to EU citizens and possibly citizens of other countries after designation by the Attorney-General. It was passed by Congress in February 2016. This is also the first time ever the US Congress extended a privacy law because the EU demanded this.

 

The Judicial Redress Act has some limits. It allows EU citizens to bring actions to US courts only if commercial data transfers are permitted between the EU and the US, and data transfer policies do not impede U.S. national security interests. These two conditions may weaken the implementation of the Umbrella Agreement by the US, as the US Attorney General could decide that the Judicial Redress Act might no longer apply to EU citizens. In this case, however, the U.S. would be in breach of the Agreement. The Agreement as such is without any conditions, and the US have to follow their obligations under international law.

 

Also, judicial redress will only be open in the US for EU citizens and not for EU “residents” (third-country nationals who live in the EU). Nonetheless, the Commission clarified that other judicial redress avenues in the US are available to all EU data subjects concerned by the transfer for law enforcement purposes, regardless of their nationality or place of residence. From the EU perspective, it would have been ideal if all persons in the EU would have been granted the right to judicial redress, but the U.S. legal tradition very often distinguishes between US citizens and non-US citizens. On the EU side, US citizens and non-US citizens can enforce their rights in court without such distinction, like everybody else. The Agreement is therefore in line with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.

 

Exemptions? Illegal under the Agreement

Under Section 552a(j)(2) of the US Privacy Act, some data are currently exempted from judicial redress, among those PNR or banking data. However, the data subject rights conferred by the Umbrella Agreement are formulated in an unconditional manner. This means that the US authorities will not be able to exempt PNR and other data anymore. Otherwise the US would again be in breach of the binding agreement. This is also the legal understanding of the Commission in its declaration.

 

Outlook

The US administration could hand over their ratification documents at the EU-US Ministerial Meeting on Justice and Home Affairs in Washington DC on 4th and 5th December. The EU will only hand over their documents after the remaining conditions have been fulfilled by the US administration, i.e. the granting of judicial redress to citizens of all EU Member States, and the repealing of the exemptions. The agreement enters into force on the first day of the month after these documents have been exchanged by both sides, therefore the earliest option could be 1st January. We hope that these procedures can still be finalised by the outgoing Obama administration. The agreement then will bind the incoming Trump administration under international law.

 

The Agreement will be subject to periodic joint reviews, the first one will take place no later than three years from the entry into force of the Umbrella Agreement and thereafter on a regular basis, and the composition of the respective delegations shall include representatives of both data protection authorities and law enforcement authorities. The findings of the joint reviews will be made public.

 

Conclusion

In sum, the agreement constitutes major progress for the protection of personal data when transferred between the EU and the US in the context of law enforcement activities. It may not be the best agreement that can be envisaged, but it is certainly the best one possible in the current situation. Moreover, the agreement does not limit or infringe any data subject rights, as it constitutes no legal basis for any further data transfers. It merely adds new rights and protections to the existing frameworks for data transfers in the context of EU US law enforcement cooperation.

 

Check out the Interview - Data protection: "Snowden case showed the US needs to deliver on trustworthy rules"

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